Concept: The Western Compact
A Contractual Order for the Western Hemisphere
Disclaimer: This proposal is a thought experiment exploring how a formalized institutional structure for the Western Hemisphere might be designed, given the 2025 National Security Strategy’s acknowledgment that NATO may no longer serve as the primary organizing structure for Western security.
Proposal To Formalize the Western Hemisphere
The Western Compact (WC) is a proposal to formalize hemispheric order around geography, power asymmetry, and restraint to compliment the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the 2025 National Security Strategy. Rather than exporting ideology and demanding compliance, the Compact formalizes a structure through incentives to form a basic security zone, with a framework for more integration where individual member states would like.
At its core is a simple bargain: the United States guarantees protection against extra-hemispheric threats, including fifth generational influence operations, and forswears political interference of member states’ sovereignty; in exchange, the hemisphere remains closed to outside hostile actors.
Formation and Membership
Membership in the Western Compact is open to every sovereign country in North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, but participation is voluntary. In addition, participation is tiered. Countries can decide for themselves how deeply they wish to integrate into the Compact.
States join because basic membership is immediately valuable and non-ideological. No country is asked to harmonize laws, adopt political norms, or submit to supranational courts. The WC is explicitly transactional in its basic form.
Basic Membership
Basic membership provides three concrete benefits.
First, members receive a formal US security guarantee against threats originating outside the Western Hemisphere. This is not a NATO-style mutual defense obligation; it does not entangle members in US wars or require expeditionary commitments. The burden is one way on the United State for defense of the hemisphere and is outward-facing only.
Second, the United States contractually commits to non-intervention in the domestic politics of member states. No regime change operations, no covert election interference, no political manipulation. This clause addresses the deepest historical grievance in Latin America and is the credibility anchor of the entire system.
Third, members receive preferential access to the US market. In a world where baseline tariffs are high, WC membership may cuts those tariffs dramatically. The benefit is immediate and measurable.
In return, members agree to a closed-hemisphere rule: no foreign military bases, no permanent troop presence, and no security treaties with extra-regional powers. The Monroe Doctrine is instantiated by opt-in.
Further Integration
Beyond basic membership, countries can voluntarily opt into deeper cooperation in higher level compacts on mutual security, trade, energy, infrastructure, or finance.
For example, Peru might choose to join the Western Compact as a basic member and also opt into the trade compact. In that case, Peru would be a “member state for trade.” If it later opted into infrastructure provisions, it would become a “member state for trade and infrastructure.” Each additional layer requires explicit agreement and modestly increases Compact authority, but also delivers greater benefits.
Participation is modular and reversible. States may add or withdraw from higher tiers while retaining basic membership. This creates an incentive gradient rather than a coercive hierarchy.
Governance
The Western Compact consists of two principal bodies: the Executive Council and the Assembly.
Before detailing these bodies, it is important to address US authority. The United States retains veto power over all proceedings of the Western Compact except for breach reviews. This reflects the reality that the U.S. is the dominant power providing security and market access. The Compact itself is not a governing body and is strictly limited to advisory, facilitative, and coordinative roles. Member sovereignty is paramount, and states determine for themselves how binding Compact commitments are domestically.
The Executive Council is responsible for day-to-day coordination. Its powers include convening meetings, setting agendas, authorizing special committees, interpreting Compact provisions, facilitating emergency and disaster coordination, managing procedural votes, and representing the Compact externally. Permanent seats on the Council would be held by major member states, such as the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba, alongside a majority of rotating seats. One illustrative structure could include six permanent seats and seven rotating seats drawn from countries such as Chile, Guyana, Belize, El Salvador, Uruguay, Canada, and Panama.
The Assembly is the lower body and acts rarely but decisively. It consists of all member states and exercises sovereign authority over foundational matters. Its powers include admitting new members, suspending or expelling members, amending the Compact, ratifying or rejecting Executive Council interpretations, adjudicating breaches of the Compact, imposing defined penalties, and approving structural changes.
The Sovereignty Enforcement Mechanism
Given the United States’ central role, the Western Compact requires a credible mechanism allowing member states recourse against US violations of Compact rules.
If a member state formally accuses the United States of political interference or another breach, the Executive Council convenes without the US being seated in a Breach Review. In this configuration, referred to as the Breach Review Committee, the Council operates without US veto power for a maximum of 10 days. The committee’s sole authority is to determine whether the allegation warrants consideration by the Assembly.
The Breach Review Committee may request evidence, including testimony, though no party is legally compelled to participate. The US may be present and submit evidence, but holds no vote and no veto during the process.
If the committee finds that interference occurred, the US veto is paused solely for this matter and the issue proceeds to a vote of the full Assembly. A finding of breach requires a two-thirds majority of the entire Assembly. This deliberately high threshold ensures that only clear, widely agreed violations succeed.
If the interference is ongoing, the United States is compelled to cease the activity. If the interference is retrospective—such as a concluded election—the US must pay a proportional fine as defined in the Compact. A benchmark fine of approximately 0.1% of US nominal GDP is illustrative, which today would amount to roughly $30 billion. These funds are directed to the injured party under Compact rules.
The availability of this option and the high-bar for success, ensure compliance by the US, because if ignored it could threaten the credibility of the entire organization and reopen the hemisphere to rival powers. Paying the fine becomes the cheaper option.
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